Andrew Roberts' new book, "Napoleon and His Marshals: Victory, Rivalry, Betrayal," examines how the French emperor's obsessive control over his generals led to failure. Drawing from 40,000 letters, the research suggests this management style contributed to the 1815 defeat at Waterloo.
The 40,000 letters of the Fondation Napoleon
The primary evidence for this re-evaluation of Napoleon Bonaparte comes from a 15-volume compendium prepared by France's Fondation Napoleon. According to the report, these previously inaccessible letters reveal a leader whose command style was defined by a "razor-sharp" but suffocating level of detail, particularly when dealing with his 26 senior military leaders known as the marshals.
This archival discovery shifts the historical narrative from Napoleon as a purely inspirational figure to one who functioned as an autocrat. the letters intermix high-level political strategy with petty admonishments, suggesting that the emperor's mental energy was often diverted from grand strategy to the minutiae of military life.
457 letters to Louis-Alexandre Berthier and the Ajaccio barracks
The scale of Napoleon's obsession is most evident in his correspondence with Louis-Alexandre Berthier, the "Great Chief of Staff." As the report says, Napoleon sent Berthier 457 letters between March 1796 and December 1797—a volume of communication that exceeded the letters sent to his own wife, Josephine.
These communications were not limited to troop movements; they included demands that a staircase in an Ajaccio barracks be properly adapted. Other examples of this micromanagement included Napoleon scolding subordinates over whether windows in a German military hospital were open or the exact placement of eagle insignia on uniforms. Such trivialities created deep frustration among talented officers like Michel Ney, whose daring leadership during the retreat from Moscow—where only 100,000 of 600,000 soldiers survived—was often undermined by the emperor's demands for exessive precision.
The Peninsular War duels and the 'divide and rule' doctrine
Napoleon Bonaparte explicitly admitted to Tsar Alexander I that he intentionally kept his marshals at variance to encourage them to expose each other's faults. This "divide and rule" strategy backfired during the Peninsular War from 1807 to 1814, where the lack of a coherent strategy against Spanish guerrillas became a liability.
The internal toxicity reached a point where marshals reportedly engaged in at least four recorded fights involving swords or challenges to duels. by prioritizing personal glory and competing for the emperor's favor over collective success, the French command structure became a collection of independent actors rather than a unified military force.
The Duke of Wellington and the cost of the 'proboscis'
The culmination of this managerial failure occurred at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. The friction and rivalries fostered by Napoleon meant that his marshals were less likely to cooperate or entertain his demands during the heat of battle, allowing the Duke of Wellington to exploit the fractures in the French line.
Wellington famously noted in a letter to General French that "nothing was too great or too small for [Napoleon's] proboscis," referencing the emperor's tendency to stick his nose into every detail. This paradox of power suggests that Napoleon's desire for total control ultimately stripped him of the independent talent requied to win the war.
The missing perspectives of the 26 marshals
While the 40,000 letters provide an exhaustive look at Napoleon's mindset, a critical gap remains: the private correspondence of the marshals themselves. The current research relies heavily on the emperor's outgoing mail, leaving it unclear if the marshals' refusal to cooperate at Waterloo was a result of long-term resentment or immediate tactical disagreements.
Comments 0