A month into the current conflict, the United States has presented a 15-point plan aimed at de-escalating hostilities with Iran. A key component of this plan focuses on halting Iran’s funding and support for its network of proxies, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthi militants in Yemen.

The Enduring Legacy of Iranian Support

The U.S. rightly prioritizes addressing Iran’s proxy network, recognizing these groups as major contributors to regional chaos. However, expectations for a swift resolution should be tempered. The late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during his 37-year reign, prioritized building and strengthening Iran-backed militias to extend the regime’s influence across the Middle East. This legacy is likely to persist beyond his leadership.

Independent Networks Emerge

While still reliant on Iranian support – particularly Hezbollah – these proxies have cultivated their own independent global networks for terrorism, procurement, finance, and logistics. This means the threat they pose will likely remain regardless of the outcome of the current conflict, requiring preparedness from the U.S. and its allies.

Global Reach of Iran's Proxies

Hezbollah, Iran’s most enduring partner, has established terrorist networks and infrastructure worldwide, operating independently of Iran. Terrorist activity linked to Hezbollah has been uncovered in locations including Cyprus, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, London, and the United States.

Hamas, while not having executed attacks outside of Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza, demonstrated pre-October 7th plans for potential strikes in Europe. Criminal cases in Germany and Denmark revealed Hamas operatives had stashed small arms in multiple European countries.

Procurement and Funding Strategies

Hezbollah and the Houthis have also developed robust international procurement networks to acquire advanced communications, electronics, and dual-use technology. These networks are crucial for building their drone capabilities, now central to their military strategies.

To conceal their activities, both groups utilize numerous front companies, often run by individuals with no apparent connection to the organizations. These fronts are particularly active in China and the United Arab Emirates, but also source supplies from Europe, Asia, and even the U.S.

Circumventing Sanctions

In 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned two Chinese companies, Hubei Chica Industrial Co. and Shenzhen Shengnan Trading Co., for assisting the Houthis in falsifying shipping documents. Hubei allegedly supplied ‘bulk quantities of chemical precursors’ for weapons, while Shenzhen Shengnan provided electronic equipment for drones.

European authorities disrupted a large-scale Hezbollah procurement network in Spain, Germany, France, and the U.K. this past summer. Front companies linked to Hezbollah were reportedly obtaining drone components for targeting Israel, leading to criminal charges in all four countries.

Independent Financial Resources

Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis all possess independent fundraising capabilities. The Houthis have reportedly begun selling weapons to Al Shabab, the Al Qaeda-linked group in Somalia, demonstrating both fundraising creativity and a surplus of weaponry.

Hamas has an extensive overseas financial infrastructure, utilizing charities and NGOs, particularly in Europe, to raise funds. Estimates suggest Hamas was raising $10 million monthly from these sources prior to the October 7th attacks, potentially rivaling Iranian funding.

While more reliant on Iran, Hezbollah also maintains its own fundraising networks in South America and West Africa, generating revenue through both legal and illicit businesses and donations from expatriate communities.

Looking Ahead

While cutting ties between Iran and its proxies is a crucial step, the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader suggests limited progress on this front. Even if Iran were to cease support, the threat from these groups would not disappear.

The U.S. should work with international partners to pressure the proxies’ independent networks, particularly in regions where they are most active. Failure to do so risks allowing the late Ayatollah’s legacy to endure. Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt are senior fellows at the Washington Institute.